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Abstract
When reasoning about self-locating belief, one should reason as if one were a randomly selected bit
of information. This principle can be considered to be an application of Bostrom’s Strong Self-Sampling
Assumption(SSSA)[2] according to which one should reason as if one were a randomly selected element
of some suitable reference class of observer-moments. The reference class is the class of all observer-
moments. In order to randomly select an observer-moment from the reference class, one first randomly
chooses a possible world w and then selects an observer-moment z from world w. The probability that
one selects z given that one has chosen w should be proportional to the amount of information that z
is capable of representing. There are both wagering arguments and relative frequency arguments that
support our theory of anthropic reasoning. Our theory works best when the amount of information
represented is finite. The infinite case is represented as a limit of a finite cases. We can learn from
experience how best to represent the infinite case as a limit of finite cases and also learn from experience
whether our theory or some other theory is the superior theory of anthropic reasoning. In order to test
which theory is best, we use standard Bayesian methodology: We just need prior probabilities for the
theories that are being tested and then we only have to use Bayes’ rule.
1 Reasoning about Self-Locating Belief
In this paper, we describe a general, Bayesian theory of anthropic reasoning. We use the expressions “an-
thropic reasoning” and “reasoning about self-locating belief” to refer to reasoning about our identity or
our temporal location. If we are suffering from amnesia, we need to figure out who we are. If we have an
appointment to meet someone at a certain time, we might wish to know the current time. Sometimes, we
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do not really care about our identity or temporal location except for the fact that reasoning about identity
or temporal location might help us figure out which worlds are most likely to be actual.
Anthropic reasoning is ubiquitous in both science and everyday life, but there are many difficult to
analyze puzzles involving probabilistic anthropic reasoning such as Sleeping Beauty[8], Doomsday[13, 7],
Lazy Adam[2], and Absent-Minded Driver[19]. We need a general theory that will allow us to analyze any
anthropic reasoning problem.
There already exists a well-known general rule for reasoning about self-locating belief. According to the
Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA)[2], one should reason as if one were a observer randomly selected from some
suitable reference class of observers. Here, by an observer is meant something that is capable of reasoning
about self-locating belief. This is a very crude and imprecise definition of what it means to be an observer,
but it will suffice for now. However we make the definition more precise, we want to be able to model normal
adult humans as observers.
The SSA is almost good enough but because observers can believe and desire different things at different
times or make different choices at different times, we need the Strong Self-Sampling Assumption (SSSA)[2]
according to which we should reason as if we were a randomly selected element of some suitable class of
observer-moments. By an observer-moment we mean an ordered pair consisting of an observer and a time
interval (and that time interval might just be a single point in time). We would use observer-moments to
represent a time-slice of an observer. But there might be other relevant ways to split an observer into parts
with each part being modelled as being capable of having its own coherent beliefs and desires and making
its own coherent decisions. In that case, we would consider each of these parts to be a separate observer-
moment. For example, if someone is suffering from multiple personality disorder and thus might be modelled
as consisting of several different personalities that exist at the same time, we might consider temporal slices
of these personalities to be observer-moments.
The SSSA is a perfectly fine general principle, but it is too underspecified. We need to know what is and
what is not an observer. The random selection from the reference class presupposes the existence of a prior
probability distribution on that reference class and the question arises what probability distribution should
be used1. We do not expect a theory of anthropic reasoning to tell us how to distribute prior probability
among the many different possible worlds2, but we do expect the theory to tell us how the prior probability
that is given to a possible world is apportioned to the several observer-moments that inhabit that world.
1And we, of course, also need to know how to choose reasonable reference classes.
2However, it might be unrealistic to believe that we should separately analyze the nonanthropic and anthropic aspects of
the problem of selecting a prior.
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We need a precise theory that will tell us which prior probability distributions should be used by observer-
moments. Almost any reasonable theory of anthropic reasoning can be interpreted as an application of the
SSSA or can be interpreted to be equivalent to the SSSA and the SSSA does allow us to apply standard
techniques for reasoning about probabilities. We are not saying very much if we just say that we should use
the SSSA. Even in the nonanthropic case, it is of limited use to just say that we are going to apply Bayesian
methodology or that we will be doing Bayesian statistics if we do not say anything about how we choose our
priors; we could (in the nonanthropic case) use reference priors[1], we could try to use a universal prior[10],
we could use empirical Bayes[6], or we could do something else that would allow us to choose priors in a
systematic way. In the anthropic case, we also need to be precise about how we generate our priors.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we introduce our centered possible worlds
formalism and some notation that will make it easier to analyze wagers. In section 3 we justify a limited in-
difference principle[9]; if we know which world is actual, but we do not know which of two observer-moments
we are and those observer-moments are in identical subjective psychological states, we should believe our-
selves equally likely to be either observer-moment. This limited indifference principle is surprisingly difficult
to justify. In section 4 we generalize our indifference principle to the case where the two-observer-moments
are not in the same subjective psychological state but they still live in the same world. In this case, there is
no question of our not knowing which of these two observer-moments we are. But we might still ask what we
should believe if we do not take into account any anthropic information when estimating probability. This is
a question about prior probability or about the random selection process used in the SSSA. We argue that
if x and y live in the same possible world and have the same capacity for representing information and they
both belong to the relevant reference class, then they should have equal probability of being chosen by the
random selection process.
Section 5 analyzes exactly what is and what is not an observer and then shows how we might derive
a certain popular assumption, the Self-Indication Assumption[5] if we add enough ghost observer-moments
to each possible world so that all worlds have the same number of observer-moments according to some
reasonable way of counting observer-moments. Section 6 discusses the SIA in more detail and explains why
we do not favor the SIA.
In section 7, we discuss the issue of choosing reference classes. Once we see that if we use maximal
reference classes, counterintuitive results can be derived both with and without using the SIA, we might
notice that we can avoid some of our problems if we use minimal reference classes. But then, as section
7.1 points out, we will not be making full use of anthropic evidence that we actually do have. In 7.2 we
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show that if minimal reference classes are used, we might be vulnerible to a collective Dutch Book. 7.2
also presents several arguments in favor of the use of almost maximal reference classes. One argument is
a Dutch Book argument and another argument is a relative frequency argument. None of these arguments
is incontrovertible and we have not really described how to handle the infinite case. We have to see which
theory of anthropic reasoning works best in practice and which method for analyzing infinite scenarios works
best.
The testing of anthropic reasoning theories can be represented using standard Bayesian methodol-
ogy(Section 8). But we have to be careful about P (E|T ), the probability that we would observe the evidence
E that we actually observe given that the theory T of anthropic reasoning is correct. If the theory T is
allowed to make use of knowledge of E in order to predict E, the fact that T can predict we observe E is
not very surprising.
Section 9 briefly describes why the mere fact that we seem to be atypical is not a reason to say that
anthropic reasoning conflicts with observation.
Section 10 relates our theory to the idea that updating is communication[16].
Section 11 discusses an application of anthropic reasoning to a puzzle (Lazy Adam) in which the decisions
of one observer (Adam) determine whether other observers exist.
Section 12 contains our conclusion and summary.
2 Formalism and Notation
In this section, we first introduce our centered world formalism (2.1), then discuss when certain information
might be considered irrelevant to estimating a posterior probability (2.2) and finally describe a notation for
representing wagers (2.3). We might judge a theory of probabilistic reasoning by how successful rational
agents are if they use the theory in order to determine how to solve decision problems; many decision
problems can be represented as problems involving wagers.
2.1 The Centered Possible Worlds Formalism
We let W represent the class of possible worlds of interest to us. W , in general, will not represent all worlds,
only the interesting worlds, and if w ∈ W , w might not actually be a possible world, but an equivalence
class of worlds. If the differences between two possible worlds are irrelevant3 , we consider them equivalent
3To say that the difference between worlds v and w is irrelevant is to say the difference is neither directly relevant or indirectly
relevant. The difference would be directly relevant if we cared about whether w is more likely to be actual than v. But even
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and refuse to distinguish between them.
All observer-moments of interest to us will be assumed able to reason coherently about which of the
worlds in W is actual. But observer-moments do not have to be perfectly rational; some reasoning problems
might be too hard for some of the observer-moments living in W . There might be some larger set V ⊃ W
of worlds such that some observer-moments living in W cannot reason coherently about which of the worlds
in V is actual.
Observer-moments of interest do have to be able to do more than just reason coherently about how likely
they think various worlds in W are to be actual. They also have to be able to reason coherently while using
only some of the knowledge that they actually have. Thus if an observer-moment actually knows K, and
K¯ is only part of her knowledge K and X ⊂ W , she should be able to reason as if she only knew K¯ and
reason coherently about how likely it is that the actual world lies in the set X. We might not impose this
requirement for all possible K¯, but we should require it for certain important K¯. One important knowledge
set is the set of propositions known to be true by all observer-moments who live in worlds in W .
But it is not just (bare) possible worlds that are of interest to us. We are really more concerned with
centered worlds[14]. A centered world is just an ordered pair consisting of a (bare) world w and a center c.
In general, many different kinds of center are possible, but in the centered worlds (w, c) that we analyze, c
will be an observer-moment that inhabits world w.
We let W∗ represent the class of centered possible worlds of interest to us. We assume that every z ∈W∗
is obtained by enriching a world w ∈ W with a center c so that z = (w, c) and that for every w ∈ W , there
exists at least one c such that (w, c) ∈ W∗. All z ∈ W∗ are assumed to know4 that they belong to W∗ and
to be able to reason probabilistically about who they are among the elements of W∗. They are assumed to
know how to apply the SSSA.
if the difference is not directly relevant, it might be indirectly relevant. If we are suffering from amnesia and want to know
whether we are named George or Bill, we might not really be very interested in whether we live in a world v in which there are
more people named George than Bill or a world w in which more are named Bill than George except for the fact that learning
v rather than w is actual might tend to cause us to increase our estimate for how likely it is that we are named George. A
precise definition of irrelevance will be provided in section 2.2.
4When we refer to z ∈ W∗ knowing or believing or getting utility from something, what we mean is the following: z is an
ordered pair (w, c) where c is an observer-moment in world w. So we should be refering to the knowledge or beliefs or utility
of c in w when we refer to something being known or believed by or the utility of z.
A problem arises when we refer to what z believes or knows or to the utility of z; z might change her beliefs or desires. She
might acquire knowledge or forget. Thus we cannot necessarily say about some proposition p that z believes that p or z does
not believe that p. Both might be true but at different times. We also have the problem of in-between-believing[20]. At certain
points in time, there might be no fact of the matter as to whether z believes that p. From some perspectives, she might be
said to believe and from others, she might be said not to believe. We shall temporarily ignore these problems and assume that
z has definite beliefs, desires, and knowledge.
We also have the problem alluded to by Weatherson[21] of vague belief states. We can either just assume that observer-
moments have crisp and not vague beliefs or we can say that if it seems that it is vague whether some observer-moment z living
in world w ∈W believes p and does not believe q or vice versa, what is really happening is that w is really two different worlds
in one of which z believes p and in the other of which z believes q.
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We assume that all z ∈ W∗ agree on a nonanthropic prior P . If w ∈ W , then P (w) represents the prior
probability that world w is actual. It would be more precise to say that P (w) represents the conditional
probability that w is actual given that the actual world lies in W (and not taking into account any knowledge
that one observer-moment in W∗ has and another does not have). Observer-moments might give nonzero
prior probability to the possibility that some world outside of W is actual, but they might be uninterested
in such a possibility or have difficulty reasoning about worlds outside of W . Thus strictly speaking observer-
moments in W∗ do not necessarily know they belong to W∗, but they reason as if they knew they belonged
to W∗.
In order to analyze the set W , it is helpful to study W∗; in order to analyze some subset V ⊂W , it will
be helpful to study a certain set V ∗ of centered possible worlds. We shall generalize the star notation so
that if V ⊂ W , z ∈ V ∗ if and only if there exists v ∈ V such that there is a center c with z = (v, c) ∈ W∗.
Thus V ∗ is the set of centered worlds in W∗ that can be obtained by enriching a world in V with a center.
In the case where V = {v} is a singleton set, we write v∗ and not {v}∗.
The star notation lets us go from bare worlds to centered worlds; in order to go in the reverse direction, if
Z ⊂W∗, we define Zˆ ⊂W as the set of w ∈W such that there exists c with (w, c) ∈ Z. If we think of (w, c)
as part of w, then Zˆ might be thought of as the set of bare worlds which contain elements of Z. If Z = {z}
is a singleton set, we write zˆ rather than Zˆ. In that case, zˆ is a singleton set consisting of just a single world;
we shall be careless about distinguishing between the singleton set and the one world it contains.
What a z ∈W∗ needs to do is the following: Given an interesting subset V ⊂W∗, compute the posterior
probability that she belongs to V . First she needs a prior probability Pz(V ∩ Rz) where Rz ⊂ W∗ is the
reference class used by z. The observer-moment is reasoning as if she were a random element of Rz and
the prior distribution Pz used to do the random selection should satisfy a certain constraint that relates the
nonanthropic prior P to the anthropic prior Pz. We require for all A ⊂ W that Pz(A ∗ ∩Rz) = P (A|Rˆz).
We want the probability P (A|Rˆz) to be obtainable5 by summing the probabilities of the observer-moments
(in the reference class) that belong to worlds in A.
Once z has a prior probability for V , she can compute her posterior Pz(V ∩Rz|Kz) where Kz represents
what z knows. The set Kz is a set such that y ∈ Kz if and only if z would say to herself that for all she
knows she might be y.
5when A contains only a finite number of observer-moments
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2.2 Irrelevance
We know that W∗ might not actually represent possible centered worlds but instead represent equivalence
classes of centered worlds and that if the difference between two worlds is irrelevant we might consider them
equivalent. We should be more precise about what irrelevance means.
So let us start with an actual set W of (bare) possible worlds and an actual set W∗ of centered worlds
rather than equivalence classes of worlds and centered worlds. We consider some observer-moment z ∈ W∗
who wants to estimate Pz(A|Kz) for some A ⊂W∗ and ask ourselves when it is acceptable for z to consider
certain (bare) worlds and consider certain centered worlds equivalent.
Let ≡ ∗ represent an equivalence relation on W∗. Let ≡ represent an equivalence relation on W . We
would normally expect there to exist some relationship between these two equivalence relations. If an
observer-moment i can exist in two different possible worlds, v and w, we might consider (v, i) and (w, i) to
be counterparts of each other and then if v ≡ w, we would expect (v, i) ≡ ∗(w, i); more generally we might
define a natural counterpart relationship between observer-moments living in different (bare) worlds and if
i living in v is a counterpart of j living in w and v ≡ w, we would expect (i, v) ≡ ∗(j, w).
If V ⊂W , then we write V≡ to represent the closure of V under ≡. Thus if w is a (bare) world, w ∈ V≡
if and only if there exists a v ∈ V with v ≡ w. If Z ⊂W∗, we write Z≡∗ to represent the closure of Z under
≡ ∗. Thus z ∈ Z≡∗ if and only if there exists y ∈ Z with y ≡ ∗z. If C is any set and R is an equivence
relation on C, then we can generate the set G of equivalence classes of C modulo R. We have g ∈ G if and
only if there exists a c ∈ C such that g is the set of elements d ∈ C with dR c. If B ⊂ C, then B mod R
refers to the set of g ∈ G with g ∩B 6= ∅.
We shall make statements about closures Z≡∗ and V≡, but it should be easy to translate these statements
into statements about equivalence classes Z mod ≡ ∗ and V mod ≡. For example, in order to evaluate a
probability for Z mod ≡ ∗, it suffices to evaluate the probability of Z≡∗. It just simplifies the exposition
to use closures rather than equivalence classes.
In order to work with closures, we need to insure that Pz is defined on all of W∗ not just on Rz, but that
is simple enough if we just specify that for all X ⊂ W∗ with X ∩ Rz = ∅, Pz(X) = 0. We might assume
that the set A whose posterior probability z wants to estimate is closed under ≡ ∗. Then what z really cares
about is whether
Pz(A|Kz) = Pz(A|(Kz)≡∗)
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and thus we care whether
Pz(A ∩Kz)
Pz(Kz)
=
Pz(A ∩ (Kz)≡∗)
Pz((Kz)≡∗)
.
Assuming that Pz(A|Kz) 6= 0, that means that we care about whether
Pz(Kz)
Pz((Kz)≡∗)
=
Pz(A ∩Kz)
Pz(A ∩ (Kz)≡∗) .
In words, this is requiring that the probability that a random element of the closure (Kz)≡∗ of the knowledge
set is actually an element of the knowledge set Kz be independent of whether that random element is also
an element of A. If this condition is true, than z can refuse to distinguish between equivalent bare worlds
and equivalent centered worlds when estimating the probability of A.
Of course in the previous paragraph, z is using the fact that the closure of her knowledge state is (Kz)≡∗
and there might exist an observer-moment y ≡ ∗z such that (Ky)≡∗ 6= (Kz)≡∗; in that case the difference
between equivalent observer-moments is not totally irrelevant even if it is basically irrelevant for z who only
cares about the posterior probability of A. If the only subsets of W∗ about which z cares are sets B that are
closed under ≡ ∗ and the differences between equivalent uncentered worlds and equivalent centered worlds
is basically irrelevant with respect to any such set B and for all z ≡ ∗y, (Kz)≡∗ = (Ky)≡∗, then from z’s
point of view, the differences between equivalent worlds and equivalent centered worlds is totally irrelevant.
2.3 Wagers
We also need some special notation to represent wagers. A wager is represented by a function f from W∗ to
R where R represents the real numbers. If z ∈ W∗, f(z) is the amount of utility that z gains by accepting
rather than rejecting the wager. We assume that the amount gained by z is independent of how other y ∈W∗
decide when offered the wager f and also independent of any other wagers that might be offered. We let f
have domain all of W∗ so that no useful information about one’s location within W∗ can be gained from the
fact that one is offered a certain wager. The return from a wager is a utility value rather than a monetary
value because utility is not necessarily linear in monetary return. We assume all z ∈ W∗ try to maximize
their expected utility
∑
y∈Kz Pz(y)f(y)
6.
We shall have occasion to add the utilities of two y and z such that Ky 6= Kz. If Ky = Kz, then z might
have to compute an expected utility and thus might have to be able to compare y utility and z utility. She
6We are assuming that there is no overlap: If x 6= y are two observer-moments in W∗, then it is not possible to be both x
and y. Thus if x and y represent time-slices of the same observer in the same possible world, the time-intervals during which x
and y live are disjoint.
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will have to be able to measure y utility and z utility on a common scale so that one unit of y utility is as
valuable as one unit of z utility. But if Ky 6= Kz, no one actually needs to measure y utility and z utility
on a common scale in order to decide what to do. But we can ask how an observer-moment would make
decisions if she did not know whether she was y or z but knew that she had a certain probability of being y
and a certain probability of being z. This really means that she has a certainly probability of being someone
just like y and a certain probability of being someone just like z7 because anyone who actually might be y
knows she is not z and vice versa. But in any case it should be possible to perform an act of imagination
and imagine that one does not know whether one is y or z and then try to figure out how one would make
decisions when not sure whether one is y or z. Even if it really does not make sense to compare y utility
and z utility if Ky 6= Kz, it is not impossible that there might be some preferred way to scale the utilities
of y and z so that one unit of y utility and one unit of z utility are equally valuable. Theories of anthropic
reasoning should work if it turns out that it makes sense to add the utilities of observer-moments y and z
with Ky 6= Kz and it will make sense to add the utilities if it is possible to measure the utilities of y and z
using a common scale.
3 A Limited Indifference Principle
In this section, we argue for a limited indifference principle that if x, y ∈W∗ with xˆ = yˆ and Kx = Ky, then
Px(x) = Px(y)[9]
8. This is a very limited principle. It only says that if there are two observer-moments who
live in the same possible world and who are in the same subjective psychogical state and for all we know we
might be one of these observer-moments, then we are no more likely to be one of them than to be the other
one.
We shall present several possible arguments for this principle. Some of these arguments are more con-
vincing than others but we do need a principle that will enable us to compute Px(x)Px(y) .
When trying to construct an argument for our limited indifference principle, we must keep in mind
that the argument should not be too easily generalizable. We do not expect a human observer-moment
that lasts ten million seconds to have the same prior probability as one that lasts one second; these two
observer-moments will not be in the same (relevant) subjective psychological state (or sequence of states).
We also need to be very clear about how limited our principle is. It is certainly not true that if Kx = Ky
and x and y inhabit different worlds that they necessarily have the same prior probability. Nor do we have
7Someone who has preferences and experiences that are very similar to the preferences and experiences of z.
8Elga’s[9] discussion refers to observers, rather than observer-moments, but his principle is in essence the same as ours.
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the principle that if x, y, z live in the same world and are in the same subjective psychological state, then
Pz({x, y}) = 2Pz(z). The problem is that there might be overlap. In the worst case x and y might be the
same observer-moment. Or they might share some of their computational hardware. Or x and y might not
be making independent observations of their environment so there might be a sense in which if I am x, then
I am also in part y. This happens with human observer-moments if x and y are observer-moments that
belong to the same observer9 and y occurs immediately after x and thus regardless of how radically and how
quickly the external environment might be changing, it takes time to correct the obsolete information y has
received from x.
The first argument for the limited indifference principle is that it is a simple principle that is not obviously
absurd and it is hard to think of another principle that is equally simple and that is workable. If Kx = Ky
and xˆ = yˆ and Px(x)Px(y) 6= 1, what is the ratio to be? We might say that Px(y) and Px(x) should depend on
the lengths of the briefest descriptions of y and x in some canonical language. But then we have the added
complexity of discovering the ideal canonical language.
The problem with this argument is that it is too easily generalizable to the case where x and y live in
different possible worlds. We certainly do not want to say that if Kx = Ky with xˆ = v 6= w = yˆ and w is a
world in which with a few exceptions every observer is a brain in a vat but v is a world more like the actual
world, that Px(x) should equal Px(y). We are not all that likely to be a brain in a vat.
The second argument is a wagering argument. We can without loss of generality restrict to the case
where both x and y know they both belong to a certain world w and they both know they are either x or
y but they do not know which one and we assume there is no overlap. If there were overlap, we could just
find some reasonable way of modifying our Px so that Px(x|x or y) + Px(y|x or y) = 1
Because Kx = Ky, we must have Px = Py. Assume that Px(y) = rPx(x) with r > 1. So Py(y) = rPy(x).
If there is a wager f such that f(y) = 1 and f(x) = −s with 1 < s < r while f(z) = 0 unless z is either x
or y, then both x and y will compute an expected value of rr+1 − sr+1 > 0 and accept the wager. But then
it is inevitable that the total return is 1 − s < 0. So it seems it would have been better if both x and y
had rejected the offer. And since x and y are in the same subjective psychological state, they would either
both accept or both reject. Thus the best option is for them to both reject and that appears to show that
if Px(y) = rPx(x), then r should not be greater than 1. A very similar argument would show that r should
not be less than 1. Thus Px(y) = Px(x).
This wagering argument is too similar to an argument that in the Prisoners dilemma scenario it is rational
9We say that x, y ∈ W∗ belong to the same observer if they are temporal slices of the same observer in the same possible
world.
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for both prisoners to cooperate because it is better that they both cooperate than that they both defect.
However, each individual prisoner is better off if she defects regardless of what the other prisoner does. The
mere fact that one prisoner cooperates does not force the other to cooperate.
In our scenario both x and y can say: “I am much more likely to be y than x. So it makes sense for me
to accept a wager f with f(y) = 1 and f(x) = −2. I know the other guy (x if I am y and y if I am x) thinks
the same thing but she is mistaken. It is not desirable that the other guy accept, but that should not stop
me from accepting because I am more likely to be y.”
It is certainly consistent to say that x and y should have equal prior probability but it is also consistent to
say that y should have ten times as much prior probability. Yet it seems intuitively reasonable if we have to
choose between two possible solutions to the problem of choosing priors that we prefer the one that results in
greater total utility and greater average utility. This argument about what is intuitively reasonable does not
generalize to the case where x and y live in different worlds; we really only care about the total or average
utility of the observer-moments who actually exist. If x and y live in the same world we can assume that we
have scaled the utility functions of x and y in such a way that it makes sense to compute a simple sum or
average of the utilities of x and y. If xˆ 6= yˆ, then we would be more interested in a weighted sum or average
of the utilities of x and y where the weights of x and y are proportional to P (xˆ) and P (yˆ) respectively.
Our third argument is that there is a sense in which it is not consistent to say that y should have greater
(for example, three times as much) prior probability, than x. If I am x (or y) and I say that “The other guy
has only a probability of 14 of being y even though the other guy is in the same subjective psychological state
as I am and I believe I have a probability of 34 of being y”, there is no obvious justification for the difference
between what I believe is my probability of being y and what I believe is the other guy’s probability. The
third argument does not generalize to the case where only one of the observer-moments x, y exists. In that
case, there would be one big difference between me and the other guy: I exist and she doesn’t.
The fourth argument is a simplified version of an argument of Elga’s[9]. The argument involves comparing
three different scenarios and is based on the assumption that similar scenarios should be analyzed similarly.
The argument is not quite convincing but it is still worth analyzing.
In the first scenario, there is only one possible world and in that world, there are only two observers,
Al and AlDup (a duplicate of Al). Originally, there was just one observer, but then at a certain point t0
in time, a duplicate of Al appeared. At any point in time subsequent to t0, Al and AlDup are in the exact
same subjective psychological state. At some time t1 after t0, Al wants to estimate the probability that
he is Al rather than AlDup. (Of course, AlDup also wants to estimate the probability that he is Al.) We
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might analyze the scenario as containing two relevant observer-moments, Al at time t1
10 and AlDup at time
t1
11. We would like to show that Al at time t1 should believe the probability that he is Al to be .5. If
we could demonstrate this, it should not be too hard to show that our limited indifference principle that
Px(x) = Px(y) if Kx = Ky and xˆ = yˆ should be true in general.
In order to help us analyze this first scenario, we consider a second scenario in which there are two possible
worlds, H and T. These worlds differ only in how an unfair coin tossed by a robot lands. If the coin lands
heads, H is actual (probability .1) and if the coin lands tails, T is actual (probability .9). In both worlds Al
and AlDup are the only observers and in both worlds at any time after time t0, Al and AlDup are in the
exact same subjective psychological state. The duplication and coin-tossing are assumed to be completely
independent processes. The coin-tossing does not affect the subjective psychological state of either Al or
AlDup. We might analyze this scenario as containing four relevant observer-moment Hal (Al at time t1 in
the heads world), Tal (Al at time t1 in the tails world), HalDup (AlDup at time t1 in the heads world) and
TalDup (AlDup at time t1 in the tails world).
Since the coin-tossing is entirely independent of the duplication, in order to show that in the first scenario
Al should believe the probability he is Al equals .5, it suffices to show that in the second scenario Hal (as
well as Tal, HalDup, and TalDup) should believe that the probability that he is Al (i.e. that he is either Hal
or Tal) to be .5.
We consider a third scenario, that is exactly like the second scenario except that at a certain time t2
later than t1 one of the two observers goes into a coma. In H, it is AlDup who goes into a coma and in T, it
is Al. At some time t3 later than t2, Al in the world H wants to estimate the probability that he is Al. Al
at time t3 in H is in the same subjective psychological state as AlDup at time t3 in T. So AlDup at t3 in T
also wants to estimate the probability that he is Al.
We might analyze the third scenario as containing six relevant observer-moments. We have the same four
relevant observer-moments that we had in the second scenario: Hal, Tal, HalDup, and TalDup. These are
all in the same subjective psychological state. We also have Hal2 (Al at time t3 in H) and TalDup2 (AlDup
at time t3 in T). Hal2 and TalDup2 are in the same subjective psychological state but their subjective
psychological state is different than the state of Hal, Tal, HalDup, and TalDup.
If we assume that Hal2 uses {Hal2,TalDup2} as his reference class, clearly Hal2 should believe that
the probability that he is Hal2 is .1. The other reasonable choice of reference class is the class consisting
10t1 might be a short time-interval rather than just a point in time.
11The reason we might consider these two observer-moments to be the only relevant observer-moments is that nothing essential
changes if we assume that both Al and AlDup are unconscious except at t1.
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of all six observer-moments. Because the coin tossing is assumed irrelevant, we would like to assert that
PHal2(Hal2|H) = PHal2(TalDup2|T ) because that would allow us to conclude that even if the larger ref-
erence class is used, Hal2’s posterior probability estimate for his being Hal2 should still be .1. However,
unfortunately, it is perfectly consistent to give Hal2 and Hal twice the prior probability of HalDup and give
Tal twice the prior probability of TalDup and TalDup2. (Regardless of how the coin falls originals have twice
the prior probability of duplicates.)
Let us just assume that Hal2 should conclude that the posterior probability of H is .1. If we could
assume that PHal(Hal|Hal or TalDup) = PHal2(Hal2|Hal2 or TalDup2) = .1, simple algebra would show
that PHal(Hal|Hal or HalDup) = .5. And then given the assumption that similar scenarios should have
similar analyses, we would have the result that in the first scenario, Al should believe that he is as
likely to be Al as AlDup. Unfortunately, Hal and Hal2 are different and it need not be the case that
PHal(Hal|Hal or TalDup) = PHal2(Hal2|Hal2 or TalDup2). It would be the case if a certain continuity as-
sumption is true, but it is not clear that the continuity assumption in question is any more obvious and any
less in need of proof than our limited indifference principle.
Assuming that our four arguments demonstrate the truth of the indifference principle that if Kx = Ky
with xˆ = yˆ, then Px(x) = Py(x), we find it natural to believe that if Kx = Ky with xˆ = yˆ, then Pz(x) = Pz(y),
for any z ∈W∗ such that x, y ∈ Rz. A general argument for this result is that Pz(x)Pz(x)+Pz(y) is z’s estimate of
how likely she should think it is that she is x given that she knows that she is either x or y12. But someone
who knows that she is either x or y would be in knowledge state Kx and thus would believe it as likely that
she be x as that she be y. Therefore, we should have Pz(x)Pz(x)+Pz(y) = .5 and Pz(x) = Pz(y).
We would also like to say something about the ratio of the prior probabilities of x and y when x and y
live in the same possible world but are not in the same subjective psychological state.
4 Assuming xˆ = yˆ what should be the value of Pz(y)Pz(x) when y, x ∈ Rz?
If x and y are in different knowledge states (Kx 6= Ky), then there is no question of an observer-moment not
knowing whether she is x or she is y, but the ratio Pz(y)Pz(x) still matters. To see why, consider the following
simple scenario.
The Fundamental Scenario:
There are only two possible worlds, v and w. If they ignore anthropic information, the observer-
12We are still assuming that overlap is not a problem.
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moments in v and w would have no reason to think one of these worlds more likely to be actual
than the other world. But observer-moments do have anthropic information available. In both
worlds, there are exactly two possible subjective psychological states, A and B. We can represent
v as containing c observer-moments in state A and d observer-moments in state B. The world
w consists of e observer-moments in state A and f in state B. The numbers c, d, e, f are all
finite. We have no problem with overlap. All the different observer-moments in each world are
genuinely distinct observer-moments and thus for example, the c observer-moments in world v
who are in state A are all distinct and do not share resources or inhibit each other’s capacity for
believing and desiring and accepting or rejecting offers to wager. Every observer-moment needs
to estimate the probability the actual world is v taking into account the anthropic information
she actually does have.
We call this scenario fundamental because if we know how to analyze this scenario, we know how to
analyze most scenarios that can be represented as having only a finite number of possible worlds with
observers and in which every world has no more than a finite number of observer-moments.
In this scenario, all observer-moments are assumed to know all the details of the scenario and to know
which subjective psychological state they are in, but in general, they do not know which world they inhabit
and have only limited information about their identity and temporal location: They just know that they are
in state A or they know they are in state B.
Assume all observer-moments in the same possible world have equal prior probability and let z be an
observer-moment who is in state A. We assume that z uses a reference class consisting of all c + d + e + f
observer-moments. Not taking into account her anthropic information, z would say that the prior probability
that both v is actual and she is in state A is Pz(A and v) = (
c
c+d )(
1
2 ). The prior probability that she is in state
A and that w is actual is ( ee+f )(
1
2 ). After taking into account her knowledge that she is in state A, we obtain
a posterior probability of
c
c+d
c
c+d+
e
e+f
for v being actual. This simplifies to c(e+f)c(e+f)+e(c+d) . If, however, z had
assumed that observer-moments in state A had many times more prior probability than observer-moments
in state B, she would arrive at a very different posterior probability. If she assumed that observer-moments
in state A had infinitely many times as much prior probability as those in state B, she would arrive at a
posterior probability of .5.
A natural hypothesis about Pz(x)Pz(y) in the case when xˆ = yˆ and x, y ∈ Rz is that prior probability should
be proportional to cognitive complexity. This is implicitly assumed in, for example, [2]. Since we want
Pz(x) = Pz(y) if Kx = Ky and xˆ = yˆ, we shall assume that observer-moments in the same subjective
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psychological state have the same amount of cognitive complexity. We do not have to make the assumption,
but if we did not make the assumption, instead of discussing the cognitive complexity I(x) of a certain
observer-moment x, we would have to discuss the average complexity of an observer-moment in world xˆ and
subjective psychological state Kx. So instead of saying that Pz(x) = P (xˆ)
I(x)
I(xˆ) where I(x) represents the
complexity of x and I(xˆ) represents the cognitive complexity of the whole set of observer-moments living in
the same world as x and we assume that the total complexity is finite, we could use the same formula but
I(x) would have to represent the average complexity of the observer-moments in xˆ ∩ Kx. Our arguments
and our exposition can be simplified if we assume that if Kx = Ky, then I(x) = I(y).
One measure of the cognitive complexity of an observer-moment z is the amount of (relevant) information
I(z) that she is capable of representing. This suggests that we should have Pz(x)Pz(y) =
I(x)
I(y) in the case where
I(x) and I(y) are both finite.
The basic reason is that we believe our information theoretic rule to be correct is that it is simple and
intuitively appealing. We also have a wagering argument for our rule and an argument based on the concept
of indecomposable or atomic moment and the idea that we should be able to represent W∗ as a union of
independent atomic moments.
We first give our wagering argument. We assume that W and W∗ are really equivalence classes of worlds
and centered worlds and that if we just specify z ∈W∗, we have not specified certain potentially important
information about z; we have not specified which decision problems13 z needs to solve. Maybe she does
not need to explicitly represent which problems she is trying to solve but she does need to devote cognitive
resources to solving these problems. Our key assumption is that the total amount of cognitive resources that
an observer-moment can devote to solving decision problems is proportional to the amount of information she
is capable of representing about who she is among the observer-moments in W∗. Or we might just assume
that the amount of information that z can store about which problems she is trying to solve is proportional
to the amount of information she is capable of representing about who she is among the elements of W∗14.
In any case, we are assuming that computational resources that can be used to solve decision problems
are scarce. In order to solve a certain decision problem, an observer-moment might need to make use of her
posterior probability estimate for how likely it is that she belongs to some set Z ⊂W∗. Even if Pz(Z|Kz) is
trivial to compute, some computational resources will be spent when z computes the probability and then
uses the probability to optimize her decision-making.
13Wagering problems are decision problem. We might also regard probability estimation problems as decision problems in
which an observer-moment is trying to maximize some kind of epistemic utility.
14Thus we are treating information storage space as the only scare resource.
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Given that scarcity of computational resources exists, we will explain why the scarcity matters. We
will use a wagering argument. Not every decision problem is a wagering problem but our argument can be
generalized to apply to decision problems that are not wagering problems. We are interested in Pz, a prior
that supposedly does not take into account any information that z has and other observer-moments in W∗
do not have. Thus we shall not take into account which wagering problem z is trying to solve. We just
assume it is some random wagering problem. We assume because computational resources are scarce and
the fact that z is a rational agent is only demonstrated when z is trying to solve some decision problem
and because there are so many possible decision problems that she might need to solve, that the probability
that z will have the computational resources available to solve a given randomly chosen decision problem
is small15 and we assume the probability is proportional to the amount of information she is capable of
representing about her location among the observer-moments in W∗. This assumption is most reasonable
for simple, easy to describe decision problems but more complex problems can be represented as a sequence
of simpler problems.
We want the observer-moments in W∗ to choose their prior probabilities in such a way as to optimize
expected utility when faced with a random wagering problem D. When computing this expected utility, we
will ignore those observer-moments who do not have the resources available to solve the wagering problem.
If we could restrict to the case where in each w ∈ W , there is at most one y ∈ w∗ who has the resources to
solve D, then the probability that a given z will actually be trying to solve D is the product of P (zˆ), the
probability that z lives in the actual world, and I(z)I(zˆ) . And that would be a reason for prior probabilities to
be proportional to amount of information represented.
In reality, there might be some worlds where many observer-moments have the resources to solve D, but
we might pretend that D comes in several different variants. There is no essential difference between the
variants, between the different ways that a decision problem might be formulated. We might describe our
situation as one in which all an observer-moment knows is that she is dealing with a random variant of a
random decision problem. If there are enough variants, then it is quite likely to be true that in each world
only at most one observer-moment will have the resources available to solve a specific random variant of
D. And we have to analyze each variant differently since each variant is a different problem and for each
variant there is a different set of observer-moments who have the available cognitive resources to deal with
the variant. Introducing these imaginary variants should not affect which prior Pz should be used. But with
the help of these variants we could see why prior probability should be proportional to cognitive complexity.
15We are assuming that which other decision problems need to be solved by z is determined by some stochastic process.
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This argument might seem to similar to an argument that in the fundamental scenario if c = e = 1 (in
both v and w, there is one observer-moment in state A) and f = 10100, then an observer-moment z in state
A should believe the two possible worlds equally probable. But this argument for Pz(v) = Pz(w) would be
ignoring the fact that observer-moments in state B exist in world w.
In our wagering argument, we treat observer-moments who do not have the resources to handle a random
problem as if they were not observer-moments. We are treating them as if they do not exist16. We are
only using our wagering argument to determine a prior. We need some way of constraining our prior. We
are following the general philosophy of making our prior as uninformed as possible, taking into account as
little as possible. If we actually have more information, we can conditionalize. Thus we will have wagering
arguments constraining what Pz is, but we will not try to provide a wagering argument to constrain the
posterior Pz( |Kz).
We also have another justification of our information-theoretic rule based on indecomposability (i.e.
atomicity).
To understand why we care about indecomposability, reflect about the fact that some observer-moments
live too long to be analyzed as unified observer-moments and should really be decomposed into sets of
shorter-lived observer-moments. There is a sense in which it is difficult to conceive of a human observer-
moment z that lasts ten thousand seconds as having definite beliefs or making definite decisions or being
in a definite subjective psychological state. In ten thousand seconds, the external environment can change
drastically. There can be justifiable drastic changes of relevant belief during those ten thousand seconds.
It might be quite misleading to reason about z as if she had a definite knowledge state Kz. Wagering or
decision-theoretic arguments based on the assumption that observer-moments have definite beliefs and make
definite decisions based on those beliefs and a computation of the action that leads to greatest expected
utility might not really be applicable (even approximately) to an observer-moment like z. A wager offered
to z during the last three hundred seconds of her life might be something about which she was ignorant for
most of her life. There is a sense in which we should not try to model z as if she were a single rational agent
with definite desires and beliefs.
It might be true just by happenstance that the long-lived observer-moment z does have definite desires
and beliefs, but if z lives long enough, it could easily be the case that one part of z is exposed to different
evidence than another part of z and thus different parts of z have different beliefs. If it makes sense to split
16This is very different from saying we want to compute the posterior probability of some specific set A and then ignoring
observer-moments who do not need to know this probability. When we know that we need to know the probability of A and
other observer-moments do not need to know this probability, we know some information that is not common knowledge to all
z ∈W∗. But we can picture all observer-moments as knowing that they are trying to solve some random decision problem.
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z into a set of smaller observer-moments and these smaller observer-moments have the capacity to disagree
about some relevant topic, then we cannot consider z to be indecomposable.
But if z is sufficiently short-lived, it might not be possible to meaningfully view z as a union of two
independent observer-moments z1 and z2 and thus we might not be able to split up z any further. We
might be able to represent z as a union of z1 and z2, but it might be the case that z1 and z2 are human
observer-moments who only live one ten-thousandth of a second and who belong to the same observer in
the same world with z2 starting her existence at the exact time z1 ceases to exist. In this situation, there is
no meaningful sense in which we could really think of z1 and z2 as being completely distinct agents who are
free to make their own decisions, arrive at their own beliefs, and independently observe their environment.
The observer-moment z2 just does not have any time to respond to new evidence that she has access to and
z1 does not have access to. It takes time to process information and formulate new beliefs and make new
decisions. We cannot reasonably represent z2 and z1 as independent rational agents.
Of course, there is always some dependence between two observer-moments y and x that belong to
the same human observer. But it can be convenient to model W∗ as consisting of a set of independent,
indecomposable observer-moments. This modelling is an idealization, but sometimes it can be a useful
approximate description.
We have explained what indecomposability means; we need to say a little more about what independence
means. If y is just another name for z, then certainly y is not independent of z. But if z and y live in the same
world and have virtually identical beliefs and would make virtually identical decisions if faced with the same
decision problems, that does not necessarily mean that z and y are extremely dependent. The similarity
between y and z might just arise because y and z are exposed to very similar external environments. If y and
z were exposed to very different environments, they would have different beliefs; in that case y and z could
be quite independent. But if the very fact that y has a certain belief or chooses to accept or reject a certain
offer to wager forces it to be the case that z has the same belief or makes the same decision about accepting
or rejecting the wager, then we have substantial dependence. There could also be complete dependence
between y and z even if Ky and Kz are very different: There would be complete dependence if once we
know Ky, we could predict what Kz would be without knowledge of the environment to which z has been
exposed. That means that even if z were exposed to a very different environment than y and even if that
environment were very different from the environment that any observer-moment in W∗ is exposed to, we
could still predict Kz knowing just Ky.
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A few more worlds about independence. The test for independence involves counterfactuals, but these
counterfactuals should not involve worlds that are too different from the actual world. We are interested, for
example, in what human observer-moments who last only one thousandth of a second actually are capable
of; we are not interested in what they could do if they could think ten thousand times more quickly than
they actually can. In the case of two observer-moments y and z both of whom live for .0001 seconds and
one of whom begins life as soon as the other dies, we are interested in the actual relationship between the
cognitive capacities of y and z, we are interested in the fact that they actually do share hardware because
thinking and learning takes time and we are not interested in some alternative world where y and z do not
share hardware.
Another point is that independence is really a relationship involving sets of observer-moments. The
observer-moment z might be capable of representing much information that is not represented by x and
capable of representing much information not represented by y, but if one knows both Kx and Ky, one
might be able to accurately predict Kz without knowing the evidence to which z has been exposed. In this
case z is highly dependent on the set of observer-moments {x, y}.
A further point is that whether z is independent of X ⊂ zˆ might be determined by a stochastic process.
Some random process A in the brain of z might determine whether we have independence. Technically, if A
can have different possible results I and II, then zˆ is not really just one possible world, but an equivalence
class of worlds: A world in which A has a result I is different from one in which it has result II, but we are
not distinguishing between these two different worlds.
The stochastic element that determines whether z is independent of X ⊂ zˆ might not be a random
process A in the brain of z; it might be some other element of the environment that is incompletely modelled
when we choose to use W as the set of all possible worlds. For example, W might not fully take into account
which questions observer-moments in W find it interesting to answer.
There can be much more said about the nature of independence, but at this point we shall just assume
that it can be reasonable to regard W∗ as a set of independent, indecomposable (i.e. atomic) moments
and we assume that if two atomic moments belong to the same possible world, they should be given the
same prior probability. The rationale for this is that prior probability should represent what we would
believe if we did not take into account any knowledge we might have that is not also known to every other
observer-moment in W∗. If we do not take into account any such knowledge, then we can treat atomic
moments x and y as if they were in the same knowledge state (as if Kx = Ky). Then if xˆ = yˆ, we would
apply our limited indifference principle and conclude that x and y should have equal prior probability. Our
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argument should not be generalized to nonatomic moments because nonatomic moments do not necessarily
have definite knowledge states.
Our assumption about atomic moments can be translated into an information-theoretic criterion. We
necessarily have for all z ∈W∗ that z ∈ Kz. But aside from having to satisfy this one simple constraint, the
knowledge state of z can be any subset of W∗ independent of the knowledge states of all other elements of
W∗. Thus each atomic observer-moment can represent |W ∗ |− 1 bits of information where |W ∗ | represents
the number of elements in W∗. And in fact our information theoretic criterion is verified: Pz(x)Pz(y) =
I(x)
I(y) if
|W ∗ | is finite. This criterion would also be verified for observer-moments x and y that could be represented
as finite unions of atomic moments.
The version of the atomic moments procedure that we have just described is unrealistic in several different
ways, but it still might be useful to reason as if it were true. One primary reason that modelling W∗ as
consisting of independent atomic moments is unrealistic is that in any realistic scenario in which all the
possibly relevant details are taken into account, |W ∗ | is huge. It is not reasonable to conceive of the z ∈W∗
as independently representing information: |W ∗ | is too many bits for one indecomposable rational agent to
know. If we work with huge equivalence classes of observer-moments so that each z ∈ W∗ is really a huge
equivalence class and |W ∗ | is very small, then the idea that W∗ consists of independent atomic moments is
more plausible.
Another reason that our modelling of W∗ as consisting of independent atomic moments might be con-
sidered unrealistic is that it takes time for an observer-moment to make inferences and while in the process
of making inferences, an observer changes her subjective psychological state. We make the idealization that
observers can take as much time as they want to apply the rules of logic and probability theory to to their
knowledge about who they are among the observer-moments in W∗. All an observer-moment z ∈ W∗ has
to do is specify which subset Kz ⊂ W∗ represents her state of knowledge; it might be some other observer-
moment who makes inferences based on that state of knowledge. Or we might model our observer-moments
as being logically omniscient and able to instaneously derive any needed conclusions17. In nonanthropic
Bayesian reasoning, we also presuppose a certain amount of logical omniscience so it should be no surprise
that we might need to model observer-moments as being perfect at logic.
We now describe a second version of our modelling of W∗ as consisting of a set of atomic moments and
in this version, we do not assume independence. It is still the case that the z ∈W∗ cannot usefully be split
into smaller observer-moments. But here the underlying assumption is that it takes a certain amount of
17or more precisely they are able to make decisions as if they could instaneously derive any needed conclusion.
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time to create a new belief, a new intention, a new decision. So excessively small observer-moments are not
meaningful. Atomic observer-moments are, by definition, moments that are large enough to be meaningful,
but not so large that they are capable of having subparts with contradictory beliefs. In this version of the
definition, an atomic observer-moment is supposed to represent a minimal unit of consciousness.
The observer-moments in W∗ are not assumed independent but for any z ∈ W∗, we can still ask how
much information is z capable of representing that is not represented by other observer-moments (i.e. how
much new information, how much unique information can z represent? Not how much is actually new but
how much could be new.). We assume that all atomic moments living in the same possible world are capable
of representing the same amount of new (relevant) information.
But even if we did not make the assumption about new information, we still might argue that atomic
moments living in the same world should have the same prior probability. If we really are reasoning as if
we did not have any anthropic knowledge about who we are among the observer-moments in world w and
x and y are atomic moments in w, we should think ourselves as likely to be x as to be y. This argument
does not generalize to the case of nonatomic moments because if x or y is nonatomic, she might have no
definite probabilistic belief about who she is among the observer-moments in W∗ (there is no unique Kx or
no unique Ky.) or no definite belief about which decision problem she has to solve.
5 The SIA and What is an Observer?
We now address the issue of exactly what is and what is not an observer or observer-moment. Our first
comment is that an observer has to be able not only to represent information but also to use that information
in a sensible manner. If faced with a decision problem, an observer needs to make sensible decisions and
these decisions should be based on a computation of expected utilities. The computation of expected utilities
requires posterior probabilities to be estimated based on the information available. There might be other
reasons an observer might want to estimate posterior probabilities. In any case, an observer, actually an
observer-moment, must be capable of having coherent probabilistic beliefs about who she is among the
observer-moments in W∗ and making coherent decisions based on those beliefs or acting as if she were
making coherent decisions based on those beliefs18,19.
18Of course if z is an observer-moment, it might take time for her compute the necessary posterior probabilities and expected
utilities and the actual computation of probabilities and utilities might be done by some other observer-moment based on the
information available to z.
19In section 4, we discussed the possibility that observer-moments may not have the computational resources to solve all the
problems they need to solve, but we can still model observers as being able to solve any given (simple) problem; we might model
observer-moments as being born with partial solutions to many problems (they might have learned from previous observer-
moments who belong to the same observer, for example), but they have difficulty handling a large amount of new information
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As specified so far, there is a certain amount of circularity in our explanation of what an observer-moment
is. A certain set W of worlds is interesting and then we enrich worlds in W with centers in order to obtain
a set W∗. This set is a set of observer-moments if each element of the set W∗ is capable of reasoning
coherently about who she is among the elements of W∗. If we had chosen a different set X of possible worlds
to start with, then we would also choose a different set of centered worlds X∗ and there might be elements
in X ∗ ∩W∗ that can be rational when reasoning about X∗ but not when reasoning about W∗. Thus the
concept of observer-moment is not absolute.
Aside from a few ways in which we can easily take into account lack of logical perfection such as the
fact that observer-moments in W∗ do not have to be able to reason well about worlds outside of W , we are
modelling observer-moments as being perfectly rational in making use of the information they have. Since
ours is a prescriptive rather than a descriptive theory, observer-moments do not actually have to be rational
in the way we model them as being rational. They just have to have the capacity to be rational. Even
modelling them as having the capacity to be rational might be a bit of an idealization, but it still might be a
useful idealization that can result in helpful advice being given to observer-moments about how they should
estimate posterior probabilities.
We just want to make sure that we are not idealizing excessively. We would like to model normal adult
humans as observers. But humans are very bad at estimating exact prior probabilities and even well-educated
people with mathematical and scientific training can easily make bad mistakes in logic or fail to notice an
argument that uses a long and complicated proof. That is true enough. But when the stakes are high enough,
humans can and will make reasonable approximate probability and utility estimates especially if they can
use artificial aids such as computers or obtain advice from expert observer-moments whom they trust.
A human z ∈ W∗ might not be able to articulately describe a good prior probability distribution P for
W , but that does not mean she does not have some implicit intuitions about the ratios of likelihoods of
worlds in W and even intuitions about what these ratios would be if she had different information available
than the information she actually does have. And these intuitions are not ad hoc or random but based on
some guiding principles of which she might only have implicit knowledge. She might not know how either
implicitly or explicitly to convert intuitive principles into prior and posterior probability distributions, but
she could do so if she had sufficient help from experts or computational devices and sufficient time. There
could, of course, be apparent contradictions in her intuitions but then she would just have to regard her
intuitions as firstly only approximate and secondly only reliable with a certain probability that is less than
about which problems they are supposed to solve.
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one. It still might be possible to arrive at reasonable prior and posterior probabilities at least for certain
W∗.
In any case, nonanthropic Bayesian reasoning if interpreted as giving advice to human decision-makers
implicitly assumes that humans have a kind of rationality they really do not possess. But nonanthropic
Bayesian reasoning is useful. In an anthropic context, it might also be useful to model humans as rational
when dealing with certain issues.
So then, yes, humans are observers. What about superhuman intelligences? They are also observers
although they might not be part of the same reference classes as humans. What about chimpanzees?
Probably not for most W∗ of interest to us, but there is much that we still do not understand about
chimpanzees. What about Neanderthals? They are very much like humans and thus should probably be
considered to be observers.
Certainly stones or even mosquitos are not observers for any interesting W∗. But if we adopt a very
liberal definition of what it means to be an observer or an observer-moment, we can reach an interesting
conclusion.
Assume we have a set W of possible worlds that contains a finite set of actually minimally rational
observers. We also imagine that each world contains a huge quantity of observers that are not minimally
rational. Assume that if we include these extra observers, then all worlds have the same number of observers.
Let us also assume that all observers, including not minimally rational observers, in the same possible world
have the same prior probability. Now let us calculate a posterior probability in stages. We want the posterior
probability that world w ∈W is actual. We start with a prior probabiiity P (w). This is just the nonanthropic
prior probability of w. Since we actually are a minimally rational observer, let us just conditionalize on
the information that we are minimally rational. After conditionalization on this information, we obtain a
semiprior probability Q(w) = NwP (w)∑
v∈W NvP (v)
where for any v ∈ W , Nv is the number of minimally rational
observers in v. This follows because each observer in world w has prior probability P (w)M where M is the total
number of observers in a possible world. Thus the prior probability of being a minimally rational observer
in world w is NwP (w)M and for any world v, the prior probability of being a minimally rational observer in
world v is NvP (v)M . Thus Q(w) is the conditional probability of w being actual given that we are minimally
rational. The semiprior gives more probability, other things being equal, to worlds with more observers.
Thus in essence we have made the Self-Indication Assumption[5] (SIA) according to which we need to first
adjust our nonanthropic prior probability distribution to take into account the fact that we exist and are
at least minimally rational. Then we can conditionalize on any more specific information that we have. In
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essence it is as if we are using Q rather than P as our nonathropic prior probability distribution since we
really do not have to account for the imaginary not even minimally rational observers and whatever they
might know and believe and decide.
It is amusing that we can derive the SIA as a special case of the SSA and we could also obtain a version
of the SIA as a special case of the SSSA. We would just need to have a measure on the observer-moments in
W∗. For example, we might use the information theoretic measure. Then we would let Nv equal the total
number of bits of information represented by the observer-moments in world v rather than the total number
of minimally rational observers and apply the same formula as in the previous paragraph for computing a
semiprior given a nonanthropic prior. But this SIA seems ill-motivated and unjustified. It really is ultimately
an assumption that we should reject, but it has many advocates and there are some appealing arguments in
favor of the SIA which do not involve vague references to taking into account the mere fact that we exist as
conscious rational beings and do not involve artifical nonrational observers.
6 The SIA
The SIA does start to seem appealing if we consider a scenario where there are only two possible worlds
v, w ∈W and no two observer-moments in the same possible world are in the same subjective psychological
state. We assume that P (v) = P (w) and that there is some observer-moment z in v who does not know
which world is actual. For all she knows she might be y who lives in world w. Given that one cannot have
two different observer-moments in the same subjective psychological state in the same world, that means
Kz = Ky = {y, z}. If we apply the SIA, then we obtain that Q(v) = NvNv+Nw . But since here we are
dealing with observer-moments rather than observers, Nv and Nw should represent the total amounts of
information that are represented by observer-moments in worlds v and w respectively. Let a be the amount
of information that y and hence z can represent. We have then Pz(z|Kz) = ( aNv ) NvNv+Nw = aNv+Nw and a
similar computation shows that Pz(y|Ky) = aNv+Nw = Pz(z|Kz). This seems satisfying: The worlds v and
w are equally likely. That means y and z are equally likely to exist. So if all an observer-moment knows is
that she is either y or z, should she not believe both options equally likely? If we did not apply the SIA and
Nv 6= Nw, then z would derive from the fact that observer-moments in knowledge state Kz are not equally
atypical in the two worlds the conclusion that the two worlds are not equally likely.
The SIA also has unfortunate consequences20. If there are only two possible worlds v and w and both
20The argument against the SIA presented in this paragraph is similar to an argument (the Presumptuous Philosopher’s
Scenario) presented in [5].
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worlds would be considered equally likely if we did not take into account any information we have that
other observer-moments do not have and the capacity of an average observer to represent information is the
approximately the same in the two worlds but w has 1010
100
times as many observers as v, the SIA would
make it very difficult for us to learn that v is the actual world. Before we acquire any evidence, we would
think w virtually certain to be actual and given the very real possibility (probability at least 10−1000) of
error in observation or interpretation of any sequence of observations, it is difficult to see how that initial
bias in favor of w could be overcome. Therefore, a Presumptuous Philosopher might tell us that it is really
unnecessary to expend any effort collecting evidence; the actual world is w. Given the fact that there are
viable cosmological theories that disagree about how many observers there are but do not disagree radically
about how atypical we are, the Presumptuous Philosopher Scenario is a real problem for the SIA.
But we might have the problem that it is difficult for additional evidence to overcome a strong initial
bias even if we do not make the Self-Indication Assumption. We might consider again the example where
there are only two possible worlds and no two observer-moments in the same possible world can be in the
same subjective psychological state. If we are observer-moment z in world v or observer-moment y in world
w with Kz = Ky, then our posterior probability estimate for v will be
a
2Nv
a
2Nv
+ a2Nw
if we do not apply the SIA.
But we might have Nw = 10
10100Nv. In that case, v would seem virtually certain to be actual. Instead of
the nonanthropic evidence giving about equal support to the theory that v is actual and the theory that w
is actual, we might have strong nonanthropic evidence in favor of w being actual. But it is very hard to
counteract the effect of the huge size of NwNv .
We might note that if the number of observers in the actual world is huge, the assumption that no
other observer-moment is in the same subjective psychological state as we are becomes rather doubtful. Our
argument in the previous paragraph depended on our being very atypical if world w is the actual world. It
is only reasonable to think that we might be all that atypical in world w if in w there is a huge number of
subjective psychological states that are actually instantiated by some observer-moment in w (huge compared
with the number of instantiated states in v). Should one try to maximize number of observers (as the SIA
would tend to lead us to do) or minimize subjective psychological states (as we would tend to do without
the SIA)? The latter seems more reasonable and more reminiscent of Occam’s razor.
Or we might take a different approach to the problem of untestability. Perhaps there is something wrong
with how we choose our supposedly nonanthropic priors when huge numbers are involved. There are problems
both with and without the SIA. Or maybe it is not our anthropic reasoning theories that are responsible
for our difficulties; there are nonanthropic reasoning theories that tells us that (on entirely nonanthropic
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grounds) one hypothesis is 10100 times more likely than another hypothesis. Here again we will run into
problems because it will be difficult to use empirical evidence to overcome that factor of 10100.
To judge the SIA, we need to return to fundamentals rather than examine what happens when we apply
the SIA to scenarios involving huge numbers. And the transition from the prior P to the semiprior Q really
is inadequately motivated. The strongest argument for the SIA is the argument involving the scenario with
the two worlds v and w and two observer-moments z and y and the fact that if we apply the SIA, we do get
Pz(w|Kz) = Pz(v|Kz). And thus z (as well as y) should consider herself as likely to be y as to be z.
But this argument is not totally convincing. It is true that objectively it would be better if both y and z
agree that that the posterior probability of v being actual is .5 rather than agreeing on some other number
and since y and z are in the same subjective psychological state, they will agree on some number. To see
that it is better if they choose .5 rather than some other number, we just have to consider wagers f with
f(x) = 0 for all observer-moments except y and z. If we use the objective, nonanthropic prior probability
of .5 for v, we see that if .5(f(y) + f(z)) > 0, it is better that both observer-moments accept the wager. If
.5(f(y) + f(z)) < 0, it is better if both reject. This seems to suggests that y and z should use a posterior
probability of .5 for v. Both y and z can even agree that it would be better if they both used the posterior
probability of .5 rather than both using some other value but y and z do not get to have a dialogue about
what to believe. They make separate decisions. If either y or z applies the SSSA and not the SIA and Nw
is much bigger than Nv, then she (y or z) will conclude that v is much more probable than w and hence she
is much more likely to be z than y.
Both y and z could say, “If I were to believe that I am as likely to be z as to be y, that would not force
the other guy (z if I am y and y if I am z) to believe the same thing and in any case, I am more likely to be
z than y. I know that means that the other guy is more likely to be y than z. But the other guy is in the
same subjective psychological state as me and will think herself to be much more likely to be z than y and
she will be wrong. But so what? She does not exist.”
We might also consider applying the SIA to a scenario where there are two possible worlds, v and w,
P (v) = P (w), Nv = 1, Nw = 10
100 and all observer-moments in both worlds are in the same subjective
psychological state. If there is a wager f such that f(z) = −109 if z ∈ v and f(z) = 1 if z ∈ w, then if all
observer-moments make the Self-Indication Assumption, they will all accept the wager and the expected total
return is .5(−109)+.5(10100) which is huge and positive. Thus it would seem, given that all observer-moments
care about expected total rather than expected average utility, that it is better that all observer-moments
accept rather than all reject. All observer-moments will accept if they believe the SIA and thus believe it
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vritually certain w is actual. They will all reject if the SIA is not used. But even if it is better that all accept
rather than all reject, we should keep in mind that decisions are not made by a committee of all observers.
If in both worlds all observer-moments except one accept and that one observer-moment rejects, than the
total expected return is .5(10100 − 1) > .5(10100 − 109) and that would be a reason for each individual
observer-moment to reject if she believes all other observer-moment (if there are other observer-moments)
will accept. Each individual observer-moment would reject if she did not use the SIA. Of course, if every
observer-moment rejects, inferior results are obtained, but each individual observer-moment makes her own
decisions.
In the previous paragraph, we used the nonanthropic prior probability P (v) = P (w) = .5 to compute
expected total return. If we really believe the SIA, we might suggest that when computing expected total
return, we should consider w much more likely than v; after all if all observer-moments believe the SIA,
they will all believe w much more likely. But if we took that suggestion, we would run into other problems.
We might consider a scenario where v and w would be considered equally likely if we ignored the SIA, but
Nw = 10Nv and all observer-moments are in the same knowledge state. We have a wager f such that
f(z) = −50 for z living in v and f(z) = 1 for z living in w. Even if the SIA is applied, w will not be
considered to be even 50 times as likely as v to be actual and all observer-moments will reject f . But if we
compute an expected total return in which w is ten times as likely as v because there are ten times as many
observers (or ten times as much information capacity to store information), then the expected total return if
all observer-moments accept f is positive: It is −50Nv11 +
10(10Nv)
11 . This suggests that if a wagering argument
based on the wager of the previous paragraph is a reason to believe the SIA, then this paragraph provides
a reason to believe a strong form of the SIA which would give w 100 times as much prior probability as v
rather than just 10 times. And then we could easily enough construct an argument for a superstrong SIA.
7 Choosing A Reference Class
7.1 Should Rz = Kz?
We have analyzed the application of the SSA and SSSA both with and without the SIA. In both cases,
there were difficulties. If we use the SIA in a version of the fundamental scenario in which c = e = 1 (one
observer-moment in state A in both worlds),f > 1 and d = 0 (observer-moments in state B only exist in
world w), observer-moments in state A will be believe v and w equally likely and that might be what we
want. Without the SIA, v and w would not be believed equally likely.
27
If we apply the SIA to a scenario in which there are only two possible worlds, v and w with P (v) = P (w),
Kx = Ky for any x, y ∈ {v, w}∗ and Nw = 109Nv, then (as in the Presumptuous Philosopher Scenario) w
will be thought much more likely than v. If we do not apply the SIA, we can see that observer-moments will
realize that v and w are equally likely.
But all this assumed the use of maximal reference class. If we do not use maximal reference classes
Rz = W∗ but instead use minimal reference classes Rz = Kz, then we could have a probability estimate of
.5 in all these scenario. The use of minimal reference classes, at least in certain scenarios (but which ones?)
has been advocated by [4].
There are three main problems with minimal reference classes. The first is that if for all z ∈ W∗ and
all w ∈ W , Kz ∩ w∗ 6= ∅, then no observer-moment will ever learn very much about which world is actual.
All observer-moments have in common a certain amount of knowledge. That is why they can agree on a
nonanthropic prior P . But no observer-moment will be able to learn very much from the fact that she has
some observational evidence that other observer-moments do not have. If z has evidence E, then in every
world in W , there is some observer-moment who also has evidence E. Thus she cannot exclude any world w
as impossible just because she has observed E. She will compute Pz(w ∗ |Kz) = Pz(w∗∩Kz)Pz(Kz) but Pz(w ∗ ∩Kz)
is just Pz(w∗) because there are no observer-moments in world w who are in the reference class but not in
Kz. Also Pz(Kz) = 1 because Kz is the whole reference class. Thus the posterior probability of w∗ is the
same as the prior probabilty. It is impossible to learn from observation. We might in fact be faced with a
situation similar to this in cosmology. There might be many plausible cosmological theories which do not
differ in their predictions as to which subjective psychological states will be experienced by at least one
observer-moment[3].
The second problem is best illustrated by a scenario in which there are only two possible worlds, v and w
and only two possible subjective psychological states A and B. In both v and w, there is just one observer-
moment in state A. In v, she is the only observer. In w, there are millions of observers. The prior probability
of v is .5. If an observer-moment is in state B, then she has conclusive evidence against v being actual. That
would lead us to think that learning that one is not in state B but rather in state A would be evidence in
favor of v being actual. But if we use Rz = Kz for all observer-moments, then the observer-moment who is
in state A would believe the posterior probability of v to be .5. and not use the fact that she has failed to
observe B as evidence.
The third problem is that in many cases, if minimal reference classes are used, a collective Dutch Book
can be constructed. A collective Dutch Book can also often be constructed even if reference classes other than
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minimal are used. We shall analyze below why we need to use not just nonminimal but actually maximal
reference classes and one of our arguments for our position will be a collective Dutch Book argument.
7.2 Why should Rz = W∗?
We believe that almost maximal reference classes should be used: Rz = W∗. W∗ might not, strictly speaking
be maximal because it might be the case that there are observer-moments X who do not belong to W∗ but
there are some observer-moments in W∗ who cannot reason coherently about whether they are elements of
X.
Keeping in mind that W∗ need not be all possible centered worlds, we can present our arguments for
why we should have Rz = W∗ for all z ∈ W∗. We will still assume that that W∗ is finite. We also assume
that if x, y, z ∈ W∗ with xˆ = yˆ and x, y ∈ Rz, then the ratio Pz(y)Pz(x) is equal to the ratio of the amounts of
information that x and y are capable of representing. These amounts are assumed to be a finite number of
bits.
The first argument is a conceptual argument. Rz = W∗ is a simple rule. Perhaps Rz = Kz is even
simpler, but that choice can run into problems for reasons we discussed above. A reason to think Rz = W∗
is especially simple is that the rule Rz = W∗ is consistent with the philosophy that priors should represent
maximal ignorance and we represent more informed knowledge states by conditionalization of the prior. This
is a simple and elegant philosophy.
The second argument is a collective Dutch Book argument. We assume that there exists four observer-
moments v1, v2, w1, w2 with Kv1 = Kw1 and Kv2 = Kw2 6= Kw1 as well as vˆ1 = vˆ2 (let v represent the
world v1 and v2 both inhabit) and wˆ1 = wˆ2 so we shall say that both w1 and w2 live in w. We shall set up
a collective Dutch Book. Observer-moments v1 and w1 will be betting on whether they are v1 or w1 and
observer-moments v2 and w2 will be betting on whether they are v2 or w2. So we need to know the ratios of
the posterior probabilities of v1 and w1 and the ratio of the posterior probabilities of v2 and w2. To compute
these ratios, we make use of the fact that for all z ∈ W∗, if y ∈ Kz the rato Pz(z|Kz)Pz(y|Kz) =
Pz(z)
Pz(y)
and thus
we need only compute ratios of prior probabilities. First we see what happens if all observer-moments use
maximal reference classes.
We make a simple computation.
Pv1 (v1)
Pv1 (w1)
=
P (v)(
I(v1)
I(v∗) )
P (w)(
I(v1)
I(w∗) )
taking into account the fact that I(v1) = I(w1).
Thus the ratio of the prior probabilities of v1 and w1 is equal to
P (v)I(w∗)
P (w)I(v∗) . This will also be the ratio of the
prior probabilities of v2 and w2. But if we do not use maximal reference classes there is no guarantee that
these probability ratios are equal. If they are not equal, we can set up a collective Dutch Book.
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The Dutch Book argument requires that the utilities of different observer-moments be combined. If we
need to combine the utilities of v1 and v2, we cannot simply add up or average their utilities. If we are some
observer-moment z ∈ W∗ reasoning as if we do not know who we are among the observer-moments in Rz,
we would try to act in such a way as to maximize
∑
y∈Rz Pz(y)U(y)
21 where U stands for utility. This tells
us that when we combine the utilities of v1 and v2, we need to compute a weighted average with weights
being proportional to prior probabilities. But if two observer-moments in Rz both live in the same world
their prior probabilities are proportional to the amount of information they can represent.
We are now ready to define a wager that sets up a Dutch Book. Assume that nonmaximal reference
classes are used and as a consequence
Pv1 (v1)
Pv1 (w1)
> r > s >
Pv2 (v2)
Pv2 (w2)
for some real numbers r, s. Let I(v1)I(v2) = q.
So we can use qU(v1) + U(v2) and qU(w1) + U(w2) to combine utilities of observer-moments in the same
world22. Let a > 1 be chosen so sa < r. Finally define the wager f so that f(v1) =
1
q , f(v2) = −a,
f(w1) = − rq , f(w2) = as, and f(z) = 0 for any observer-moment z other than v1, v2, w1, w2. Then v1 (and
w1) will accept the wager because she thinks herself more than r times as likely to be v1 as to be w1. The
observer-moment w1 (and w2) will accept the wager because she believes herself less than s times more likely
to be w1 than to be w2. But then when we combine the utilities of the observer-moments in world v, we get
q( 1q )− a < 0 and −q( rq ) + as < 0. So no matter which world is actual, we have a loss of utility.
Our third argument is a relative frequency argument. In order to test the adequacy of our theory of
anthropic reasoning, we consider what happens if a scenario is repeated many times. We ask ourselves if
there is an approximate equality between relative frequencies and our posterior probability estimates. Let
us consider a finite scenario. Thus both W and W∗ are finite. In order to completely describe our scenario,
we would have to specify the values of I(z) for all z ∈W∗ and also specify a nonanthropic prior probability
distribution P on W . Now let M be some very large number and let us repeat our scenario M times. In
order for the relative frequencies we compute to be most meaningful, we want the different repetitions of the
same scenario to be independent repetitions.
Thus we will define a product scenario(actually a power scenario). The set of all possible worlds is
WM . Thus WM is the set of length M sequences of worlds belonging to W . Any observer-moment living
in a world w = (w1, w2, w3, . . . , wM ) ∈ WM is a sequence (z1, z2, z3, . . . , zn) such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ M ,
zi is an observer-moment belonging to wi. We have P (w) =
∏
1≤i≤M P (wi) if w = (w1, w2, w3, . . . wM )
where P (wi) is the prior probability of wi in the unrepeated scenario. We want I(z) =
∏
i≤i≤M I(zi) where
z = (z1, z2, z3, . . . , zM ). Of course the prior probability of (w1, w2, w3, . . . , wM ) should be the product of the
21We assume that overlap is not a problem.
22But we can set up our Dutch Book for any q > 0.
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prior probabilities of the wi if we are going to be independently repeating the same scenario M times. It is
not quite as intuitive why the amount of information is also computed by taking a product, but if we imagine
that z1 has six different places where it can store information and z2 has five different places, then there are
six times five ways of obtaining an ordered pair of places for storing information with the first member of
the ordered pair coming from z1 and the second from z2. We also need to define knowledge states. We do
so in the obvious way: Kz =
∏
Kzi if z = (z1, z2, z3, . . . , zM ).
For any world v ∈ W , if we choose a world w at random from WM , we see that if M is large enough
that it is virtually certain that the proportion of wi in the M -tuple (w1, w2, w3, . . . , wM ) such that wi = v
is approximately equal to P (v). Thus the number of indexes i such that wi = v should be approximately
MP (v). This is one examle of relative frequencies in the repeated scenario and probabilities in the unrepeated
scenario being approximately equal. But we are more interested in probabilities that take into account
anthropic knowledge.
Let us choose an observer-moment z = (z1, z2, z3, . . . , zM ) who lives in the random world w. We want to
analyze what z knows and that means we need to analyze what each zi knows. We are actually not interested
in all indexes. We will pick some possible knowledge state K ⊆ W∗ and some world v ∈ W . (So we are
analyzing some world of the unrepeated scenario and some possible state of knowledge of observer-moments
in that scenario.) We are interested in the sets iK and iv where iK is the set of i such that Kzi = K and iV
is the set of i such that wi = V .
Let nK,v be the total amount of information that can be represented by the set of observer-moments z
in world v who have Kz = K. If z is a typical observer-moment in the product scenario and M is large
enough, we expect the number of indexes i that are in iK ∩ iv to be approximately equal to P (v)M( nK,vI(v∗) ).
If i ∈ iv, the probability that i ∈ iK is nK,vI(v∗) if z is a typical observer-moment in (W∗)M (and hence zi is
a typical element of wi = v) and if M is large, it typically will be the case that a fraction approximately
equal to
nK,v
I(v∗) of the i ∈ iv will also be in iK . The number of indexes i in iK should be approximately
equal to M
∑
x∈W P (x)
nK,x
I(x∗) if M is large enough. Thus if M is large enough the proportion of indexes
in iK that actually belong to iK ∩ iv is approximately equal to the posterior probability for world v that
would be computed by an observer-moment in knowledge state K in the unrepeated scenario (assuming the
observer-moment uses maximal reference classes). So if we want relative frequencies to be approximately
equal to probabilities, we should use maximal reference classes.
All this assumes that z is typical. The typicality was computed using a prior probability distribution on
centered worlds in the product scenario. This distribution implicitly assumed that maximal reference classes
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should be used but if we are discussing how unusual we are among all the observer-moments who live in
WM , there really is no natural alternative to maximal reference classes. We need a probability distribution
that is defined for the whole set of observer-moments who live in w23. . But z could be atypical. So we have
not proven our theory to be the only reasonable theory of anthropic reasoning. There are other nonabsurd
theories of anthropic reasoning. And we have barely discussed the infinite case. In the next section we
discuss both issues.
8 The Infinite Case and Learning from Experience
Up until this point we have focused on the case where the total number of worlds or equivalence classes of
worlds is finite, the number of observers in each world is finite and each observer could only represent a finite
amount of information. But the actual world might contain an infinity of observers. So we have to be able
to analyze the infinite case.
Scenarios involving infinite sets can be problematic even if no anthropic reasoning is involved. There
really is no magic formula for handling the infinite case. We just have to represent the infinite case as a
limit of finite cases which we know how to handle. The problem is that there are many different ways of
representing an infinite scenario as a limit of finite scenarios which are intended to approximate the infinite
scenario.
We could approximate an infinite case by saying that all except finitely many observers in finitely many
worlds are irrelevant. We could approximate an infinite case by saying that we shall work with equivalence
classes of worlds and observer-moments and only deal with a finite number of equivalence classes. Thus
perhaps each centered world can be represented in a canonical way as an infinite sequence of bits and we
shall not distinguish between centered worlds whose first few bits are the same. Or we could combines the
idea of working with equivalence classes with the idea of working with subsets.
23One might object to the whole idea of using a product scenario in which a typical observer-moment z = (z1, z2, z3, · · · , zm)
can be represented by a list of zi with very different reference classes. We might think that relative frequencies in such a product
scenario tells us nothing about the unrepeated scenario because it mixes up observer-moments in different reference classes but
if all that is different about the observer-moments is how much they know and what they know, it does not seem strange to
mix up observer-moments of different kinds. I might conduct an experiment which can have several possible results and some
of the information about the results might be known to some observer-moments but not other observers in the certain possible
worlds. If I repeat the experiment several times, it might be quite likely that which set of observers know which of the results
might change and the results themselves might also be different. If we use minimal reference classes, observer-moments zi would
use different reference classes just because they know different things and yet it seems to perfectly reasonable to mix up these
different observer-moments in one product scenario. If we use the fundamental scenario as our unrepeated scenario and specify
that the only reason that some observer-moments are in state A and others are in state B is that they have reached different
conclusions after following the same experimental protocal and they have only reached different conclusions because they have
read a different number on a dial, then it seems perfectly reasonable to mix up state A and state B observer-moments in a
repeated (i.e. product) scenario.
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But there are too many possible ways of representing an infinite scenario as a limit of finite scenarios. It
is difficult to think of a purely theoretical and totally convincing reason for preferring one method to another
method. We have to learn from experience which method works best. Even in the finite case, our arguments
for our theory of anthropic reasoning are not incontrovertible. Someone else might have a different theory
that is not implausible and ultimately we will rely on our experience to determine which theory is better.
We use standard Bayesian methodology for using experience to determine which of two theories T1, T2 of
anthropic reasoning is superior. We judge theories by their prior probability of being the correct theory. (So
we assume we know P (T1) and P (T2), the prior probabilities of the two theories. Different researchers will
disagree about what these probabilities should be, but we can hope that the disagreement is not so great that
there cannot be agreement on which theory has the greater posterior probability.) We also judge theories by
how well they predict the available evidence E. So we need to know P (E|T1) and P (E|T2). In our intended
application, if we are an observer-moment z, our available evidence is represented by our knowledge state
Kz. So P (E|Ti) would represent the prior probability Pz(Kz) that according to theory Ti, z should give to
Kz. We can compute the odds ratio:
P (T1|E)
P (T2|E) =
P (T1)P (E|T1)
P (T2)P (E|T2)
in order to compare the adequacy of the two theories.
There are two important points that need to be made about our approach for testing theories. One point
that needs to be made is that we are only comparing theories of anthropic reasoning; T1 and T2 are assumed
to agree on the correct nonanthropic probability distribution for W . Another point is that we are assuming
that both T1 and T2 use the SSSA (or SSA) and that our formalism makes sense when applied to T1 and T2
but the SSSA formalism is quite flexible. We can choose to use whatever Rz and Pz we please provided our
Pz is consistent with the nonanthropic prior P and we can even add artificial observer-moments to W∗. So
W∗ might include stones.
There are also pitfalls associated with our Bayesian methodology. Any theory T that uses minimal
reference classes Rz = Kz will have P (E|T ) = Pz(Kz) = 1. Thus T gets too much credit for predicting
the evidence E. One way to compensate for this is to declare that T has low prior probability. Another
approach is to require of T more than just that it work in predicting what we experience; we might also
require that it work when used by other observer-moments. But if we are z and we are assessing how well
T worked when used by some other observer-moment y, we can assess things other than how well Ky is
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predicted. For example, y and z might be observer-moments belonging to the same observer o with z being
the unique observer-moment who lives four hours after y in world yˆ = zˆ. The observer-moment y might
make probabilistic predictions about what z will observe and we can assess how true those predictions are.
To formalize and generalize what is happening, we introduce the formalism of special relationships: One
special relationship might be being the best friend of and another special relationship might be belonging to
the same observer-moment in the same possible world but living four hours later. The formalism of special
relationships allows us to refer to observer-moments using relative rather than absolute vocabulary. A special
relationship S is just a relation S ⊂ W ∗ ×W∗ such that if aSb, then aˆ = bˆ. Thus a special relationship is
just a set of pairs of centered worlds in which each pair is a pair representing observer-moments living in the
same (bare) possible world. A special relationship is not necessarily a function or the inverse of a function:
We can have a special relationship S and a, b, c,∈ W∗ with a 6= c with both aSb and cSb and can have a
special relationship with b 6= c, aSb and aSc.
If y ∈ W∗ and y knows she is y (i.e. Ky = {y}) and S is a special relationship, y can consider
S(y) = {z : ySz}. For any z in W∗, she can compute Py(Kz|S(y)), the probability that a random observer-
moment in relationship S with y will be in knowledge state Kz. If y does not know that she is y, but only
that she is in the larger set Ky, she can still predict P (y, S,Kz) =
∑
x∈Ky Py(x|Ky)Px(Kz|S(x)). This would
be y’s prediction of the probability that a random observer-moment in relationship S to herself is in state
Kz.
But we are not the predictor y, but some other observer-moment z testing the accuracy of y’s predictions.
Assume that there is only one special relationship S of interest to us and that for any x ∈ Kz, there is at most
one observer-moment y such that ySx. If ySx, use the notation S−1(x) to refer to y. In this situation, we
might say that P (E|T ) =∑Pz(x)P (S−1(x), S,Kz) where we sum over all x ∈ Kz such that S−1(x) exists.
We assume that at least one such x exists. We are evaluating how likely it is that the observer-moment who
is in relationship S with us will predict that the observer-moment with whom she is in relationship S will
be in knowledge state Kz.
If there are several different relationships of interest to us or if there exists x ∈ Kz such that there
is more than one y with ySx, then our calculation becomes more problematic. To treat the case where
there can be several different y in the relationship with a given x ∈ Kz, we redefine S−1(x) to refer to
the set of y such that ySx and then we might write P (E|T ) =∑Pz(x)∑CyP (y, S,Kz) where the second
summation is over all y ∈ S−1(x) and the Cy are weighting coefficients such that
∑
y∈S−1(x) Cy = 1. These
Cy weight the relative importance of the different y. We would like to use prior probabilities to determine
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the weights, but which prior probabilities? We cannot assume that according to theory T , any of the y
are in Rz. We cannot assume that there is any v ∈ W∗ such that S−1(x) ⊂ Rv. We might just have to
say that the Cy are some measure of how much we care about each y; perhaps the Cy have to be obtained
by using some other theory than T to compute prior probabilities. If there were two different special
relationships S1, S2 but both S
−1
1 (x) and S
−1
2 (x) never contained more than one element, we would have to
compute
∑
Pz(x)(C1P (S
−1
1 (x), S1,Kz) + C2P (S
−1
2 (x), S2,Kz)) where C1, C2 are weights that have to be
determined. These weights might represent how much we care about the different special relationships.
Even if there is only one special relationship S of interest to us and S−1(x) never has more than one
element for x ∈ Kz, our test might not be very adequate if we might be too similar to the S−1(x). If there
is not very much that we know and the S−1(x) do not know, then there will not be much actual predicting
for us to test.
9 Has Anthropic Reasoning Already Been Disconfirmed by Ob-
servation?
It has been claimed that anthropic reasoning has already been disconfirmed by experience[18]. But that is
impossible. If we have to estimate posterior probabilities and we have strictly anthropic knowledge, then we
have to use some theory of anthropic reasoning even if our theory is that we should use minimal reference
classes, which means that we are ignoring our anthropic information if we only want to predict nonanthropic
facts. Although it cannot be true that anthropic reasoning is mistaken; it can be true that there exists a
theory of anthropic reasoning is that is superior to the one we advocate or that no one has yet successfully
constructed a plausible and usable general theory of anthropic reasoning that actually works and allows us
to make useful predictions.
There are several reasons one might think that anthropic reasoning has already been disconfirmed. For
example, if we use anthropic reasoning of the kind advocated in this paper, we might find it remarkable that
we are observer-moments who are living in a civilization with a relatively small capacity for representing
information24. But these arguments against anthropic reasoning depend on assumptions about nonanthropic
priors. We might be using the wrong nonanthropoic priors. Another possibility is that our nonanthropic
priors might not be prior enough. If we really did not know whether we inhabited a region of space-time
with civilizations which currently can represent amounts of information that are much greater than what our
24That is how we would translate into our terminology [17]’s concern that there might be a conflict between anthropic
reasoning and observation because we are part of a civilization with only a few observers.
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civilization can represent, we might use very different priors. Another possibility is that our information-
theoretic criterion is incorrect. Or perhaps we are incapable of reasoning coherently about most of the
observer-moments who live in other civilizations and in that case anthropic reasoning really would not apply.
10 On Ignoring Anthropic Information and Updating As Commu-
nication
A point that needs to be made is that for most of this paper, we have not assumed that there is any special
relationship between observer-moments who belong to the same observer. So there is no reason that anything
like Meacham’s Learning Principle[15] be valid.25 But in practice, we usually update by a procedure that
is fairly close to conditionalization of a chronologically prior distribubtion (a distribution believed in by a
previous observer-moment who is part of the same observer as we) and we often ignore anthropic information
when computing probabilities if all we care about is the posterior probabilities of uncentered possible worlds.
And we might wonder why this is often acceptable. It is often acceptable for the reason that we are allowed
to conditionalize on the knowledge Kz in stages, rather than do all the conditionalization in one step.
If we are z ∈W∗, we might divide our knowledge Kz into parts Ki such that ∩i∈IKi = Kz and split the
process of conditionalization on Kz into a set of processes of conditionalizing on each Ki. Some of these Ki
might represent messages we receive from other observer-moments and some might represent other kinds of
knowledge (i.e. they might represent what we are currently observing now). So we might first conditionalize
on the knowledge we receive from other observer-moments and then conditionalize on the knowledge we
receive from our current observation. So we are viewing updating as communication[16].
All any other observer-moment y can truthfully tell us is that she (y) belongs to some superset K of
Ky
26 (i.e. K ⊃ Ky). She will not necessarily direct that message only to us or direct the message to
all other observer-moments who live in the same world; instead we assume that the message goes to all
observer-moments x such that yRx where R is some special relationship. So we might use the notation
MK,R to refer to messages we think we have received. If we think we have received MK,R that means we
25According to the Learning Principle, “A sequential updating rule R should be such that the subject’s current de dicto
credences lie in the span of the credences R prescribes to her extended doxastic epistemic successors.” In Meacham’s formulation,
a doxastic successor of observer-moment z is a later time-slice of the observer to which z belongs. We need to allow for extended
successors because observers might die or become unconscious and in that case R should just assign reasonable credences to
imaginary observer-moments that would have existed if only certain observers were not dead or unconscious during certain
time-intervals. But regardless of how we fill in the details of what it means to be an extended successor, in our formulation,
there is no special relationship between observer-moments merely because they belong to the same observer.
26She might try to tell us something about her posterior probability distribution Py( |Ky) but since her anthropic prior Py
should be the same as ours, the most she can really tell us is that she belongs to Ky .
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believe that someone in relationship R to us has sent us a message that they know that they belong to K.
It is, possible, that we have misread or misinterpreted the message. It is possible that we are just imagining
that we have received a message when we really have not received any such message. It is possible that the
observer-moment who sent us the message might be intentionally or unintentionally deceiving us. Or that
when we receive a message MK,R, the message really means more than just that some observer-moment in
relationship R to us knows K; it means more because certain observer-moments who know K and are in
relationship R to us do not send us the message MK,R because they are inarticulate. All this is possible but
under favorable circumstances, we should be able to compute reasonable posterior probabilities by a simple
procedure that makes use of the information in our messages.
Assume that we do not have to worry about misreading or misinterpreting messages or observer-moments
lying about what they know or observer-moments being inarticulate. Thus we might consider an observer-
moment in world w who actually receives the message MK,R as being equivalent to any observer-moment
y ∈ w∗ such that there exists x ∈ w∗ with xRy and Kx ⊂ K. Assume also that we might consider observer-
moments in relationship R to each other to be equivalent. Finally assume that the difference between
equivalent observer-moments is basically irrelevant. All these assumptions might be true if R represents the
relationship of belonging to the same observer in the same world but living one moment earlier and we do
not care about our temporal location. Under these assumption we might reason as if K contained part of
our relevant knowledge; actually we might know that we do not belong to K (an earlier time-stage of us
belonged to K) but if we ignore irrelevant details, we might regard ourselves as belonging to K. We can use
the relevant knowledge in K to define a probability distribution on W∗ that we might regard as a prior and
then conditionalize on the additional relevant knowledge that we have.
11 Lazy Adam
At this point, we would like to discuss a particularly perplexing scenario the Lazy Adam scenario[2]. What
makes the scenario particularly perplexing is that it involves one observer-moment making decisions that
affect the total number of observers that exist (and the total amount of information that can be represented).
One observer, Adam, can make a decision that will affect whether other observers exists. But certainly
observer-moments can affect whether other observer-moments exist: People can choose to or choose not to
reproduce and they can choose to take or not to take potentially suicidal risks.
We shall introduce the Lazy Adam scenario (actually a streamlined version of Bostrom’s scenario) by first
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describing simpler scenarios and then gradually modifying them until we obtain a Lazy Adam sceanario. We
start with a version of the Fundamental Scenario in which c = e = 1 while d = 0 and f = 10100. Thus world
v has exactly one observer-moment and that observer-moment is in knowledge state A. The world w also
has one observer-moment in state A as well 10100 in state B. We might assume that there is some stochastic
cosmological process h that took place early in the history of the universe (before there were any observers)
that is responsible for the actual world being v or w and that h is a typical instance of a well-understand
class H of processes and based on what every observer-moment knows about H, there is no reason to think
v more likely to be actual than w, but once an observer-moment z who is in state A takes into account that
she is in state A, she will believe it virtually certain that the actual world is v.
Nothing essential changes if instead of observer-moments just knowing whether they are in state A or
state B, they also know some irrelevant information. We assume that every observer consists of just one
observer-moment and that all observers know their birth rank; an observer has birth rank i if there were
exactly i − 1 observers who were born before her. But what really matters is whether an observer is low
rank (rank 1) or high rank (rank greater than 1). Once one knows whether one is low or high rank, then it
is irrelevant what one’s exact rank is.
Nothing essential changes if we allow each observer to consist of a large number of atomic observer-
moments representing different time-slices of an observer’s existence. Every observer is composed of the
same number of atomic moments and every atomic moment knows not only her birth rank but also her
moment rank. An atomic observer-moment z belonging to observer o is of moment rank i if exactly i − 1
atomic moments belonging to o lived before z started her life. The scenario we are describing in this
paragraph is a simplified version of the Doomsday Argument scenario. A low birth rank observer-moment
will think it virtually certain that the actual world is v.
Many researchers believe the conclusion of the Doomsday Argument (that world v is virtually certain to
be actual) to be highly problematic. We believe the Doomsday Argument to be valid because the natural
ways to avoid the Doomsday Argument conclusion do not work. The SIA is not an assumption we wish
to make. If we use minimal reference classes, we can be Dutch Booked. There are good arguments for
using universal reference classes. But in this section, we are not concerned primarily with whether the
Doomsday Argument is valid but with whether the Lazy Adam scenario is really any more paradoxical than
the Doomsday Argument scenario and our answer is no.
It does not really matter if it is a stochastic cosmological process or a stochastic process in the brain of
some observer (the observer with birth rank one and let us call him Adam) that determines whether the
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actual world is v or w. The stochastic process in Adam’s brain might determine whether or not he pushes a
certain button of a cloning machine at a certain time t. If the button is pressed at time t, 10100 − 1 clones
of Adam will be constructed. Adam knows enough about biology and physics to know that the cloning
machine works. If at time t, the button is not pressed, Adam will be the only observer. Adam, and in fact
all observer-moments, know all this. They also all know that not taking into account any knowledge that one
observer-moment has and another observer does not have but just taking into account objective physics and
biology including neurology, they should believe that the probability that the button is pressed is 1− 2−100.
Our calculations will be affected by the fact that the nonanthropic probability of v is 2−100 rather than
.5. In order to explain our calculations, we also need to say more about the knowledge states of observer-
moments. Time t is the kth moment of Adam’s life. Every observer other than Adam knows at any time
during his life which world is actual. The first k − 1 moments of Adam only know their birth and moment
rank27, but do not know which world is actual. All other moments of Adam do know which world is actual.
Assume z is one of the first k − 1 moments of Adam. Because z is so much more atypical (10100 times as
atypical) in world w than world v, z will believe v virtually certain to be actual. The factor of 10100 is much
greater than the ratio P (w)P (v) = 2
100 − 1 of the nonanthropic probabilities of the two possible worlds.
We might have P (w)P (v) = 2
100 − 1 if Adam is under a compulsion to press the button at time t if a certain
fair coin does not land heads 100 times in a row when it is tossed. We assume that the results of the one
hundred tosses are independent and that Adam (and all other observers) know enough about physics and
about the coin in question to know that the coin is in fact fair and the results of the tosses independent.
What that means is that Adam before time t will predict that it is almost certain the coin in question will
land heads one hundred times in a row. If Adam does not take into account the fact that he knows he is
Adam or if all observers had a phase of their lives when they are totally ignorant of their birth rank and
Adam were currently in that phase, then Adam will conclude that the coin almost certainly will not land
heads one hundred times in a row. But if Adam does know he is Adam, he should use that information,
but then he will predict that the coin will almost certainly land heads one hundred times in a row. If there
were no connection between the coin toss sequence and Adam’s pressing the button, he would predict the
coin almost certainly would not land heads one hundred times in a row. This might seem like a spooky
correlation (it seems that there is a spooky correlation between whether Adam has made a resolution to
press the button and whether the coin will land heads one hundred times in a row) but the basic anomaly is
the difference between anthropic (taking into account the anthropic knowledge Adam has that he is Adam)
27Adam does not see the actual tosses on a one by one basis; he just knows at moment k whether they all landed heads or
not
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and nonanthropic probability estimates for the probability that w is actual. Once there is an anomaly, it will
usually not be too hard to play around with the anomaly and make it seem very striking. That there will
sometimes exist a difference (a difference we might view as anomolous) between anthropic and nonanthropic
probabilities is inevitable if we make it a policy to take into account anthropic information when estimating
the probabilities of (bare) possible worlds.
We might now modify our scenario so that Adam is not necessarily under a compulsion to press the
button if the coin does not land heads one hundred times in a row. He could cure himself of the compulsion
if he wants to. If he cures himself, there is no cloning. So then Adam is really making a decision whether to
make an irrevocable conditional resolution. This is a resolution to press the button if and only if the coin
lands tails at least once during the one hundred toss sequence. The question is: Should Adam make the
resolution?
We might first ask ourselves why Adam might want to make the resolution. One reason might be
that Adam really wants that coin to land heads one hundred times in a row and he thinks by making that
resolution, he can prevent the coin from landing tails even one out of a hundred times. If we are skeptical that
Adam really cares that much about how the coin falls, we might imagine some other objectively improbable
event like a wounded deer wandering into Adam’s backyard.
But if Adam really wants that coin to land heads one hundred times in a row and there is no cost to
making the resolution, why shouldn’t he make the resolution? It might actually work. So we have to assume
that there is a cost because making the resolution is inevitably part of a larger strategy. Adam will rely on
the strategy working and thus bet on the improbable event occurring. In the case where the improbable event
is a wounded dear walking into Adam’s yard, the bet would mean that Adam would stay home and not go
out hunting and gathering because he is confident the improbable event will happen. If it does not happen,
he will be hungry. The bet is not worth making unless it is highly likely that the objectively improbable
event occurs.
Should Adam make the resolution? If we apply causal decision theory correctly, we see that the answer
is no. Assume Adam does not make the resolution. And the coin did not land heads one hundred times
in a row. Then it would not have landed heads one hundred times in a row if he had made the resolution.
There is no objective causal relationship between coin tosses and making the resolution and Adam knows
that28. Another way to see what is going on is to notice that the decision maker is Adam regardless of
28Adam knows that if he does not take into account the fact that he knows he is Adam, he would conclude that even if Adam
makes the resolution, the probability that there will one hundred heads in a row is very small. If Adam does not makes the
resolution and just throws the coin one hundred times and does not take into account the fact that he is Adam and only draws
conclusions from what he knows about the physics of coin-tossing, he will also conclude that the coin is very unlikely to land
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which world is actual. Once Adam has made a computation of how likely v is given the fact that he knows
that in the actual world he is Adam, he does not get another chance to draw inferences from the fact that
it is remarkable that he is Adam. If in the actual world, he is Adam, he will inevitably be Adam in the
counterfactual world in which he made a different decision than the decision actually made.
Thus if Adam decides not to make the resolution and the coin did not land head one hundred times in
a row, it would not have landed heads one hundred times in a row if he had not made the resolution and
if Adam decides to make the resolution and the coin lands heads one hundred times in a row, it would still
have landed one heads one hundred times in a row.
12 Conclusion
In this section we summarize our theory and mention some topics that need further investigation.
A simple elegant theory of anthropic reasoning can be developed (at least in the finite case) by making
precise Bostrom’s SSSA. An observer-moment z living a certain possible world wants to know the probability
that a certain proposition is true. This proposition will be about which world is actual and about her identity
within the actual world. Thus what z really wants to know is the probability that she belongs to a certain
set A of centered worlds ( where centered worlds are pairs consisting of a world w and an observer-moment
o. If z is observer-moment o living in w, then we say z is the centered world (w, o).). She will begin with a
nonathropic prior probability distribution P on a set W of possible worlds and then our theory will enable
her to use P to construct a prior probability distribution on some subset Rz of the set W∗ of possible
centered worlds.
The assumption that we should first generate a nonanthropic prior based on information common to all
observer-moments and then use a theory of anthropic reason to construct Pz might be doubted. Perhaps
the prior Pz should be constructed in one step; maybe we should just require that if y ∈ W∗, Pz(y) should
be proportional to the complexity of the shortest description of y in some canonical language; something
similar to this is suggested by Hutter[11]. The problem is that it is difficult to know which language should
be chosen as the canonical language. If a minimal description length approach is properly implemented,
perhaps we might arrive at posterior probability estimates not that different from those suggested by our
theory.
Assuming we are going to separate the nonanthropic and anthropic parts of the task of generating Pz,
heads one hundred times in a row.
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we still have to decide before we worry about how the probability P (w) that is given to a world should be
split up among the observer-moments belonging to that world, whether we should use the SIA to revise P
to give more probability to worlds with more observers or observer-moments. But the SIA is unmotivated.
Wagering arguments that might be used in favor of the SIA do not work because they ignore the fact that
decisions are made by individual observer-moments belonging to particular worlds. Decisions are not made
by a committee of observer-moments who might belong to different worlds.
We next have to chose a reference class on a non ad-hoc basis and the simplest choice is Rz = W∗. Both
relative frequency and Dutch Book arguments can be given in favor of this Rz = W∗. An other possible
simple rule is Rz = Kz but that rule does not allow observer-moments to use strictly anthropic information
to revise their probabilities for (bare) possible worlds and if we are to link cosmology with observation, we
will sometimes have to let strictly anthropic information affect judgements about which possible world is
most likely to be actual. There is no obvious alternative to Rz = W∗ if we want a simple rule that analyzes
simple scenarios similarly and that arrives at reasonable results.
Next we have to specify a rule for constructing Pz on Rz. We have the limited indifference principle that
if x and y are two observer-moments in the same subjective psychological state that live in the same world
w, Pz(x) = Pz(y). There are several arguments for this intuively natural principle, but the basic justification
aside from the simplicity of the rule is that if we knew that w is actual, then both x and y exist and if x
believes she is more likely to be x than y, then since x and y are in the same knowledge state, y will also
believe that she is more likely to be x than y. But x and y have the same information available and they
cannot both be more likely to be x than y.
It is a little more difficult to know how to allocate probability in the case where x and y know different
things. We contend that if x and y belong to the same world, then Pz(x)Pz(y) should equal
I(x)
I(y) where I stands
for the amount of information that an observer-moment can represent. We might also use another criterion:
Let x and y be indecomposable observer-moments, which cannot meaningfully be represented as a union of
smaller observer-moments. (If, for example, it takes a certain amount of time to acquire new information
or a new belief or because conscious awareness requires a certain minimal amount of complexity, it might
not be meaningful to split certain observer-moments into smaller parts.) If x and y live in the same possible
world, then because they are both atomic, they should have the same prior probability.
Still other criteria might be explored. For example, we might suggest that the ratio of the prior prob-
abilities of x and y should equal the ratio of the complexities of the shortest descriptions of the subjective
psychological states of x and y.
42
Ultimately what matters is what works in practice and we can use fairly standard Bayesian methodology
to test theories of anthropic reasoning and that includes testing rules for representing infinite scenarios as
limits of finite scenarios. A big problem with testing theories of anthropic reasoning is determining prior
probabilities that a theory is correct. More work needs to be done on that issue.
We might also evaluate theories of anthropic reasoning by how well they maximize expected epistemic
utility [12]. But that computation requires combining the utilities of different observer-moments who live
in the same possible world and may not be in the same subjective psychological state. It is not clear that
when combining these utilities, we should use a simple summation or averaging rather than a weighted sum
or average where weights are proportional to prior probabilities of observer-moments (however it is these
very probabilities that we have difficulty estimating). Another issue is that we want a simple theory that
applies to several different possible W∗ and that means that we might have to combine the utilities of
observer-moments who live in several different W∗ and the question arises how that should be done.
In any case, our theory is a simple theory. Like any theory of anthropic reasoning, it will have some
unfortunate consequences: We have to accept the validity of the Doomsday Argument. We also have to
accept strange coincidences in the Lazy Adam scenario. We do not have to advocate Adam making an
intuitively implausible decision, but we do have to accept a strange coincidence. But in some scenarios,
our theory will lead observer-moments to make decisions that would have worse consequences than if all
observer-moments agreed on a different theory of anthropic reasoning. However, it needs to be reiterated
that decisions are made by individual observer-moments and not by committees of observer-moments (not
even by a committee consisting of all the observer-moments that belong to a certain observer in a certain
possible world).
Our theory does have some problematic consequences, but it is simple and natural and avoids many of
the problems (such as vulneribility to Dutch Books) of some other theories.
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